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TREATY CHANGE? 
The appetite for treaty change was seriously 
dampened in the European Union in the 
aftermath of the Lisbon treaty. Public opinion, 
European institutions, and above all Member 
States, were reluctant to consider a new exercise 
of the type which had been at the centre of the 
stage, from the Laeken European Council in 
2001 to the final entry into force of the new 
treaty on 1 December 2009. There was large 
agreement that long and intricate institutional 
debates, negotiations and re-negotiations, failed 
referendums with risks of catastrophic failure 
were to be avoided at all cost. 
Is this changing? Perhaps! 
In her first speech in the Bundestag as newly re-
elected Chancellor, on 18 December 2013, 
Angela Merkel clearly advocated treaty 
modifications. “We belong to those who say: 
when the treaty bases are not sufficient, then we 
must re-examine the treaties. However, after the 
Lisbon treaty, we have a situation in Europe 
where everybody says that we can re-examine 
everything but the only thing we cannot change 
are the treaties. On that base I do not believe 
that we will be able to establish a Europe that 
works. I know that it is difficult to push treaty 
change in member states. But if we want more 
Europe, we must also accept change in specified 
fields of competence. Yes, we must make good 
treaties. But in a world in constant change, we 
cannot take the view that at a given point we 
concluded a treaty in Lisbon and will from then 
onwards never change the treaties again. That is 
not going to work!” (Das wird nicht functionieren).1 
Some weeks earlier a group of well-known 
German academics (lawyers, economists, 
political scientists) took the unusual step of 
publishing a joint statement with the title 
Towards a Euro Union. The group, known as the 
Glienicker Group, also calls for treaty change: 
“To achieve this political agenda, the euro area 
needs a new contractual basis of its own. What 
is called for now is a Euro-treaty to replace 
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previous piecemeal reforms. With such a 
contract, collective insights and experiences 
from the crisis would be stored permanently. A 
Euro-treaty would re-focus public debate on 
Europe’s political needs and wishes, away from 
the current preoccupation with what is legally 
feasible”.2  
Also towards the end of 2013, a group of 
Members of the European Parliament, called the 
Spinelli Group and known for sharing the 
federalist convictions of the Italian statesman, 
drafted and published a Fundamental Law of the 
European Union, which is “a comprehensive 
revision of the Treaty of Lisbon (2007). 
Replacing the existing treaties, it takes a major 
step towards a federal union”.3 
We also know that, in January 2013, Prime 
Minister David Cameron indicated that the 
British Government wanted a “fundamental, 
far-reaching change”. The aim is to reach a new 
settlement based on flexibility and cooperation 
leading to an in-out referendum: “To stay in the 
EU on these new terms; or come out 
altogether”. The Prime Minister adds that “if 
there is no appetite for a new Treaty for us all, 
then of course Britain should be ready to 
address the changes we need in a negotiation 
with our European partners.”4 
It seems clear that the taboo, that for some time 
inhibited any suggestion of new treaty 
negotiation, has faded. It is now promoted by 
different people, with entirely opposite views of 
what is needed for the European Union. 
Will this new tendency be successful? 
In the medium term the arguments seem 
compelling. As Chancellor Merkel points out, 
there is no reason to believe that the Lisbon 
treaty is the last word in a political process 
which has developed, through various treaties, 
over sixty years, at the centre of European 
politics. The Glienicker Group may have a point 
when they say that the euro area needs a new 
contractual basis of its own, a Euro-treaty to 
replace previous piecemeal reforms. When 
David Cameron says that his government wants 
either to reach fundamental far-reaching change 
or to leave the Union, he clearly accepts that 
both alternatives imply a new treaty. Arguments 
may go in opposite directions, but they converge 
on the necessity of change. In the medium term 
they cannot be ignored. 
The underlying question is about timing, and 
two considerations come to mind. 
In the first instance it seems quite impossible, in 
the present circumstances, to draft any 
substantial new treaty which would find the 
required and unanimous support of all Member 
States. Public opinion is not in that mood. It 
feels the anguish created by the biggest 
economic and financial crisis in recent times, 
disillusionment, justified or not, about efforts to 
overcome that crisis, widespread concern about 
the future. This has led to acrimonious debate 
and resentment, between creditors and debtors, 
North and South, euro-ins and euro-outs. Some 
wounds go quite deep, and they are recent. 
Treaty negotiation in the European Union has 
always been a difficult exercise and the difficulty 
has logically increased with the number of 
member states. Regular recourse to direct 
democracy through referendums adds an 
element of uncertainty. To launch such an 
exercise in the present atmosphere seems 
condemned to dismal and dangerous failure. 
But the atmosphere may change. A few years of 
economic growth, albeit slow growth, would 
make a difference. What would happen if the 
Union were to address, with what means it has, 
the problem of unemployment, favour mobility, 
devise initiatives for better training of workers, 
act jointly against illegal immigration and 
unreported employment and perhaps even 
address minimum social rights? If the Euro zone 
consolidated its currency by a banking union, 
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effective macroeconomic policy coordination 
and credible budgets? If it seriously addressed 
energy policy and common rules on the 
environment? Perhaps even some progress on 
foreign policy coordination! None of this is 
impossible and the atmosphere would change. 
With the passage of time, perhaps two or three 
active years, wounds would heal and resentment 
decrease. A stronger and more dynamic Union 
could then consider treaty change with more 
equanimity.  
A second consideration is linked to the position 
of the British Government. The European 
policy announced in January 2013 by David 
Cameron is a two-fold gamble. His first bet is 
that he will persuade European partners to 
accept fundamental and far-reaching change of 
some agreed policies or procedures that are no 
longer convenient for British public opinion and 
government. He then further bets that these 
changes will enable him to win a referendum in 
2017 on the UK’s future status in the European 
Union. This gamble may have its justification in 
British politics but it puts other member states 
in a quandary: 
 They are requested to modify the 
fundamental objectives of the Union. It 
should become a flexible, adaptable structure 
pursuing the ideal of cooperation. Most 
Member States would look to OECD for 
that. 
 They are requested to engage a negotiation in 
which each Member State indicates what part 
of the whole seems inconvenient to it 
(“outside its comfort zone”). This is, by its 
very nature, a highly destructive exercise.  
 And the end-result would be submitted to a 
referendum which might well make the 
whole exercise useless if Britain decided to 
leave the Union. 
But why should other Member States take those 
risks? Most of them are gradually coming to a 
completely opposite conclusion, namely that a 
higher level of integration will be necessary to 
consolidate their currency. It would seem, for 
them, much more rational, and infinitely easier, 
to invert the premises, namely to await the result 
of the British referendum announced for 2017, 
before negotiating issues on the basis of its 
result. The fact is that you do not negotiate in 
the same way with someone who is going to 
leave and someone who is going to stay: you 
need to know! 
Both these considerations lead to the conclusion 
that it would be most unwise to open 
negotiations on treaty change in the short term. 
But, given the justified pressure for change, it 
would be appropriate to open such negotiations, 
perhaps around 2018, in the second part of the 
future European Parliament legislature, in a 
more congenial atmosphere and at a time when 
Cameron’s gamble would have been played out. 
In the meanwhile we should consider what 
possible reform can be introduced in various 
institutions without treaty change. 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
It is well known that each successive European 
treaty has increased the powers of the European 
Parliament. This has been most obvious in 
recent years when the Union’s life and activities 
were dominated by crisis management. The 
normative power of Parliament was confirmed 
by the important, at times decisive, role it had in 
the adoption of the various new legal 
instruments required, notably the Six Pack and 
the Two Pack. The Parliament also sees its 
control power indirectly increased by the 
unprecedented implementing powers given, by 
these new instruments, to the Commission, 
because, as the treaty says “The Commission, as 
a body, shall be responsible to the European 
Parliament”. The December 2012 European 
Council conclusions say that “any new steps 
towards strengthening economic governance 
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will need to be accompanied by further steps 
towards stronger legitimacy and accountability”.  
However the euro crisis has also highlighted two 
questions, linked to democracy and legitimacy, 
which need to be addressed. 
First, the crisis has shown that many decisions 
have to be taken at one level (Union or euro 
area), and implemented at another (by the 
Member States), and they concern economic 
and social policies which frequently lie at the 
heart of the national political debate. Some of 
these decisions may be intrusive and constrain 
national decision making. In such cases 
democratic legitimacy and accountability are 
required both at European and national level: 
there is a need for double legitimacy. This 
implies coordination and dialogue between 
European and national levels of democracy. The 
European Council stated that “new mechanisms 
to increase the level of cooperation between 
national parliaments and the European 
Parliament” could be useful, and recommended 
“the organization and promotion of a 
conference of their representatives to discuss 
EMU related issues”.5 The TSCG asks the 
European Parliament and national parliaments 
together to determine the organisation and 
promotion of a conference of their 
representatives in order to discuss budgetary 
policies and other issues.6 It may be too early to 
draw any conclusions from the few meetings 
this “conference” has held: it works on the basis 
of consensus, which is poorly adapted to such a 
large gathering. But the newly elected Parliament 
should obviously seek, by this or by other 
means, closer cooperation with national 
Parliaments.  
Second, the European Parliament is occasionally 
called upon to deliberate on legal acts and 
policies affecting only the euro area. Parliament 
maintains that it is entitled to intervene in these 
matters as a unitary democratic representative of 
the Union polity. Others maintain that only 
MEPs from euro area countries could 
legitimately vote on euro area matters and 
participate in related accountability mechanisms. 
What would happen in case Parliament was 
called to vote on a given decision or 
recommendation linked to the euro area, and the 
decision was rejected due to the determinant 
vote of British MEPs? The potential problem 
that arises could only be settled in substance by 
treaty change. But the Commission has 
underlined that the European Parliament has the 
possibility of adapting its internal organisation to 
a stronger EMU. “For instance, it could set up a 
special committee on euro matters in charge of 
any scrutiny and decision-making pertaining 
especially to the euro area”.7 The future 
Parliament may also want to consider that 
suggestion. 
THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
The European Council became an institution of 
the EU when the Lisbon treaty entered into 
force on 1 December 2009, at a moment when 
the world and the Union faced a major 
economic and financial crisis. It had been for 
many years, de facto, the major locus of power in 
the Union. But now it had become an 
institution, it had a permanent president, and it 
was operating as a major actor in a major crisis. 
This modified the institutional balance of the 
Union. The European Council was recognised 
as the initiator of new projects, the main crisis 
manager and the ultimate decision-maker. As a 
result, the traditional “institutional triangle” 
looked a bit different. 
This institutional development is criticised in 
Parliament, by the Commission and elsewhere as 
a dangerous intergovernmental drift endangering 
the “Community method”, which has been 
central to European decision making for 
decennia. It is said to weaken the Commission 
and the visibility of its president, to be a source 
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of confusion in the public eye and to escape 
parliamentary control. 
It can be argued that the matter is not quite as 
clear cut; that the European Council with a 
permanent president is not purely and simply 
intergovernmental, that the implementing 
powers of the Commission are greater than ever 
and that the Community method is, by nature, 
essentially legislative (“the ordinary legislative 
procedure” art. 289 TFEU) and therefore has its 
limits.8 
But the negative perception is quite widespread 
and needs to be addressed. 
One option considered in the Convention, and 
advocated elsewhere from time to time, is to 
have one single president chairing both the 
European Council and the Commission. This is 
supposed to avoid competition between two 
presidents and two institutions, and give a single 
“political face” to the EU. It seems at least 
doubtful whether in fact a single person would 
be physically able to exercise adequately two 
such demanding and absorbing tasks with 
conflicting agendas. More importantly, it seems 
obvious that the independence of the 
Commission, so important for the smaller 
Member States, would be compromised if it was 
chaired by the President of the European 
Council, who would be duty bound to defend 
the positions taken by that institution. This 
option does not seem very fruitful. 
A more promising line of thought is to suggest 
that the European Council, and its president, 
should accept a greater level of accountability to 
the European Parliament. As indicated by Luuk 
van Middelaar,9 members of the European 
Council operate both as national leaders and as 
members of an EU institution. As national 
leaders, they answer to their national legislature; 
as members of an EU institution they should 
accept some accountability towards the 
European Parliament. If this was an accepted 
practice and not a legal obligation, it would not 
require treaty change. It would undoubtedly 
strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the 
institutional structure. 
THE COMMISSION 
There is no doubt that implementing powers of 
the Commission have been considerably 
increased by a number of legal instruments 
adopted as a consequence of the euro crisis. In 
some ways the Commission is more powerful 
than it was. “Never in the past have so many 
competences been exercised at EU level”, as 
President Barroso has underlined.10 
Nevertheless, the Commission is generally 
perceived as weaker than it was in former years. 
This weakness is commonly attributed to 
excessive caution in the exercise of its power, 
and excessive concern not to offend the views 
of Member States, big Member States in 
particular. Political choices and personalities 
obviously have some impact on the strength of 
any institution, but in the case of the 
Commission, the following four structural 
problems can be identified. 
First of all, for reasons known to everybody, the 
number of Commissioners has grown from 9, in 
the 1960s, to 28 today. It is difficult to establish 
that there are in fact 28 different functions to be 
exercised at Commission level, and that this 
justifies as many cabinets and even more 
directors general. The structure is top-heavy: 
some Commissioners, their cabinets, and their 
director generals are underemployed.  
Secondly, the institution was defined as a college 
which had a mandate to define and formulate 
together the collective interest of the 
Community and initiate action. Collegiality has 
never been easy to apply in practice and 
experience generally shows that the principle is 
only workable with a limited number of 
participants. A bigger group needs a strong 
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presidency and, as a result, participants, in 
practice, concentrate on their specific 
responsibility, not on the whole. Collegiality in 
the Commission has, compared to former years, 
diminished.  
A third structural problem relates to the fact that 
the institution was conceived as a supranational 
and independent body. Upon appointment 
Commissioners swear to accept no instructions. 
However, Member States have repeatedly 
insisted that it was absolutely essential for them 
that one of their nationals should be member of 
the Commission. This insistence is, by itself, a 
source of confusion. Commissioners acquire a 
national character, and public opinion 
understands that Commissioners are appointed 
to defend national interests. Otherwise, 
governments would not be so insistent. 
Finally, according to the treaty, the Commission 
takes its decisions by simple majority. In fact, 
for a number of years, it has never taken votes: 
it works by consensus. The fact that a simple 
majority could, in theory, exclude all major 
players is an obvious cause for reluctance to 
vote. Yet decision by consensus is a 
characteristic of intergovernmental structures 
and procedures. An institution which has a 
supranational character, as the treaty says, can be 
expected to vote. Executive institutions, such as 
the Commission, must, at times, act decisively 
and fast: consensus is not the best procedure to 
that end.  
These points combine to create a structural 
weakness in the Commission, which is 
detrimental to the authority, legitimacy and 
credibility of the institution. Over the years its 
supranational character has been blurred. And 
all points of weakness are linked to size. The 
Lisbon treaty had foreseen a reduction of the 
number of Commissioners on the basis of a 
“system of strictly equal rotation between the 
Member States”. This seems to underline the 
“national” character of Commissioners. Many 
observers consider that such a system would be 
less than optimal, but it could only be altered by 
new treaty provisions. In any case it has been 
postponed to a distant future by the European 
Council.11 
Some useful modifications of current practice 
could however be taken in consideration. When 
collegiality becomes unrealistic, it is advisable to 
increase the authority and the legitimacy of the 
Commission President. In the circumstances it 
strengthens the institution itself.  
One option, strongly advocated by the 
European Parliament, would be to appoint as 
President the candidate pre-selected by the 
winning party in European elections.12 This 
would give the president of the Commission the 
democratic legitimacy coming from the support 
of at least a plurality in Parliament. Some point 
out however that this procedure carries the risk 
of politicising the Commission itself and giving 
a partisan character to an institution conceived 
as the independent guardian of the treaty. Up to 
now, the appointment of the President of the 
Commission has been agreed (sometimes with 
difficulty) by the Heads of Government. 
Whether the European Council fully shares the 
views of Parliament on the new procedure 
remains in doubt. Presumably this doubt will be 
clarified in the weeks following the elections. 
Another option (which could be additional to, 
or independent from, the previous one) would 
be to give to the President elect a dominant role 
de facto in the selection of other members of the 
Commission. The European Council could 
agree to leave to him the first choice of each 
Commissioner. Combined with the following 
point it would give the President considerable 
and lasting authority in the Commission. 
The President should be free to attribute 
competences to each Commissioner, and to 
modify these at a later stage. The Commission 
could be structured in clusters, each of these 
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grouping a number of Commissioners, under 
the effective leadership of a Vice-President, with 
a collective responsibility for one field of 
Commission activity (external relations, budget 
finance and money, internal market etc.). Some 
Commissioners could be without portfolio, as 
commonly occurs in national governments. 
These could work within one cluster or have 
horizontal responsibilities such as relations with 
national Parliaments. 
The administrative structure of the Commission 
has grown in parallel with the number of 
Commissioners, each of these wanting a director 
general answering to him. That link should be 
broken. A sizeable reduction of the number of 
general directorates (as was done some years ago 
within the Council secretariat) would streamline 
the administrative structure and facilitate 
internal coordination.  
The Commission should, like the European 
Parliament, seek closer and more regular contact 
with national parliaments. This should become a 
part of its normal task. 
CONCLUSION 
Suggestions for renegotiation of existing treaties 
are relatively new in the post-Lisbon European 
debate. They come from various quarters and 
with completely different and opposite motives, 
but some are put forward at a high level of 
political authority. The pressure is likely to 
increase and the most probable outcome, as past 
history shows, is indeed, in the medium term, 
renegotiation. But it would be unwise to attempt 
renegotiation in the present atmosphere of 
disillusionment, anxiety and resentment, and 
without clarifying the final choice of the United 
Kingdom. 
Significant change in the working of the 
institutions can be made without treaty change. 
The European Parliament should consider 
further developments in its relationship with 
national parliaments and also address the 
singularity of the euro area. The European 
Council is also a part of the institutional 
framework of the Union and should accept, as 
such, some democratic accountability towards 
the European Parliament. The Commission 
suffers from its excessive size, but there are 
ways and means, outside treaty change, of 
mitigating that weakness. 
There are obviously more pressing issues in the 
European electoral debate than institutional 
questions, but they will, as usual, be part of that 
debate. 
Philippe de Schoutheete is former Belgian 
Representative to the European Union and 
Member of the Board of Directors of the 
Egmont Institute. 
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Elections”. The project intends to bring the 
debate on the European elections closer to 
the citizens, by focusing on those EU issues 
that are of particular importance to them.
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